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of the Von Hake 1987 Trust, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
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HARRY EDWARD THOMAS, aka 
ED THOMAS, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 920643-CA 
EXPLANATORY NOTE 
No Addendum has been included in this Brief because there 
is nothing of significance that could be attached to satisfy this 
requirement. This matter went to the Supreme Court on Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and the Supreme Court remanded the 
case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to allow the parties 
to brief the question of why the appeal should not have been 
dismissed. There is no lower court opinion or decision to be 
reviewed. The Court of Appeals initiated the dismissal discussions 
at the appellate level, and the parties dealt with this topic in 
previous briefs and memoranda. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD W. VON HAKE, Trustee 
of the Von Hake 1987 Trust, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HARRY EDWARD THOMAS, aka 
ED THOMAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920643-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS OPINIONS 
The Utah Court of Appeals entered an opinion in the above 
matter on August 10, 1993. The Court ruled that the appeal should 
be dismissed because defendant had failed to serve a thirty-day 
jail sentence imposed upon him for Contempt of Court in 1984. 
Appellant then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to have that 
ruling reviewed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court partially 
granted the Petition by an unpublished minute entry on December 2, 
1993, and the matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals with 
instructions to allow the parties to brief the question of why the 
appeal should not have been dismissed. The Court of Appeals has 
asked the parties to discuss in their briefs whether dismissal of 
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the appeal is an appropriate sanction under all of the 
circumstances of this case. In that regard, the parties were 
instructed to address the following sub-issues: 
1. Whether D'Aston actually requires a 30-day grace 
period for contumacious litigants or whether it merely permits 
such a grace period in the discretion of the appellate court; 
2. If a 30-day grace period is otherwise required, 
whether it may be dispensed with in situations where it is 
physically impossible for defendant to bring himself into 
timely compliance with the Trial Court's Orders and process, 
including in the situation of defendant's incarceration out of 
state; 
3. If incarceration out of State might in some instances 
preclude dismissal and require instead a grace period longer 
than 30 days, whether the result should be different in cases 
where defendant had ample opportunity, pre-incarceration, to 
discharge the contempt sanction pending against him. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 26, 1982, judgment was entered by the District 
Court of Kane County in the sum of $987,200.00 in favor of the 
plaintiff in the case of Richard A. Von Hake v. Harry Edward Thomas 
and 1st National Credit Corporation. The jury award included 
amounts for both general and punitive damages. That judgment was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1985 in a decision that is found 
in 705 P.2d 766. Defendant was a resident of the State of Utah at 
the time the original Judgment was entered by the Court. 
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Since Thomas failed to file a supersedeas bond in 
connection with his appeal, no stay was granted and plaintiff went 
forward with collection efforts while the appeal was pending. In 
1984, Thomas was found guilty by the Trial Court of criminal 
contempt for failing to produce certain tax returns he had 
described in prior testimony and for his failure to appear at a 
court hearing to show cause why he should not be found in contempt 
of court. The judge sentenced him to serve thirty days in the Kane 
County Jail as a punishment for that contempt. 
Mr. Thomas appealed his conviction, and a stay of the 
sentence was granted pending that appeal. In 1988 the Supreme 
Court reversed the civil judgment of contempt that had been entered 
by the Trial Court. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
criminal contempt conviction and remanded the case to the District 
Court for execution of the thirty-day sentence. See 759 P.2d 1162. 
The lower court then issued a Bench Warrant instructing the Sheriff 
of Kane County to arrest Mr. Thomas and carry out the sentence 
imposed by the Court. Mr. Thomas has never voluntarily surrendered 
himself to the Sheriff to serve that sentence, and the Sheriff has 
never been able to arrest him in the State of Utah. The sentence 
has never been served. 
There has never been any indication that Mr. Thomas is 
interested in serving the sentence imposed upon him by the Court. 
Court records show that copies of the original conviction for 
contempt and the decision of the Supreme Court on Appeal were 
forwarded to defendant's counsel immediately following their entry 
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by the respective courts involved. In 1991, Mr, Thomas was 
convicted of Tax Fraud in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, and he was sentenced to serve five years in the 
Federal Penitentiary. That sentence was stayed while he appealed 
that conviction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit recently affirmed the Trial Court's decision. On 
April 12, 1993, Mr. Thomas became a ward of the United States 
Bureau of Prisons. He is now incarcerated in the Federal 
Penitentiary at Boron, California, and his release date has been 
set for July 10, 1996. 
The action now before the Court was filed by the 
plaintiff on December 31, 1990 to renew the Judgment entered 
against the defendant on March 26, 1982. The Trial Court granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and defendant appealed. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without ruling on the 
merits when it learned that defendant had failed to serve the 
thirty-day sentence imposed upon him for contempt. This decision 
was based upon the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the case of 
Piston v. Piston 790 P.2d 590. Appellant now seeks by Writ of 
Certiorari to have that dismissal reversed. 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted in part 
by the Supreme Court, and the case was remanded to the Utah Court 
of Appeals for further briefing by the parties on the question of 
whether the dismissal of the appeal is an appropriate sanction 
under all of the circumstances of the case. This Brief will 
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address that issue and the sub-issues that were outlined by the 
Court of Appeals in its Order of January 7, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The only facts that are relevant to the matter now before 
the Court are as follows: 
1. In 1984, Harry Edward Thomas was found guilty by the 
Trial Court of criminal contempt for failing to produce certain tax 
returns he had described in prior testimony and for his failure to 
appear at a court hearing to show cause why he should not be found 
in contempt of court for that violation. The judge sentenced him 
to serve thirty days in the Kane County Jail as punishment for that 
contempt. 
2. Mr. Thomas appealed the Judgment and sentence of the 
Court, and the execution of the thirty-day jail sentence was stayed 
pending that appeal. 
3. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Utah reversed the civil 
contempt conviction because the Trial Court had failed to enter 
written findings of fact as required by prior State law. But the 
Court affirmed the criminal contempt conviction and remanded the 
case to the District Court for execution of the thirty-day 
sentence. See 759 P.2d 1162. 
4. Notice of the conviction and sentence of the Trial 
Court was forwarded to defendant's counsel after its entry by the 
Court. Notice of the affirmance of the contempt conviction and 
sentence was also forwarded to counsel after it was entered by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
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5. The Trial Court then issued a Bench Warrant and 
instructed the Sheriff of Kane County to arrest the defendant and 
carry out the sentence of the Court. 
6. Mr. Thomas had five years prior to the present appeal 
to produce himself voluntarily for service of the sentence imposed 
by the Court. He never did so. 
7. Mr. Thomas moved to the State of Wyoming in 1984, and 
he has avoided service of the Bench Warrant by the Sheriff of Kane 
County for the full five-year period. There is no indication that 
Mr. Thomas is interested in serving the sentence imposed upon him 
by the Court. 
8. Mr. Thomas became a ward of the United States Bureau 
of Prisons on April 12, 1993, and he is now incarcerated in the 
Federal Penitentiary at Boron, California, with a release date set 
for July 10, 1996. He is presently unable to voluntarily present 
himself to the Sheriff of Kane County to serve the sentence imposed 
upon him in 1984 for Contempt of Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since we are dealing with the appeal from a criminal 
contempt conviction, the principles outlined by the D'Aston case 
relating to civil contempt appeals does not apply to this case. 
Under the cases discussed in the D'Aston case relating to the 
appeal from criminal contempt convictions, we should follow the 
principles enunciated in the Tuttle and Hardy cases. These cases 
make no provisions for a grace period to allow one convicted of 
criminal contempt to bring himself into compliance with any Court 
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Orders before his appeal can go forward. Since defendant is, in 
effect, a fugitive from justice, the principles relating to 
criminal contempt should be followed in this case. This means that 
defendant's appeal should be dismissed until he has brought himself 
into compliance with the Court's previous Orders and has served the 
sentence imposed upon him by the Court. After he has completed 
these measures, he can ask the Court to reinstate his appeal. This 
will properly avoid the complex measures that may be associated 
with the dismissal of civil appeals pending his compliance with 
previous Orders of the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
DISMISSAL OF THE PRESENT APPEAL 
WAS AN APPROPRIATE SANCTION TO BE IMPOSED 
UPON THE DEFENDANT UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
Throughout this entire appellate proceeding, the parties 
and the Courts seem to have overlooked one pivotal factor that 
governs the disposition of this entire matter. Although the Trial 
Court apparently found Mr. Thomas guilty of both civil and criminal 
contempt, the Supreme Court reversed the civil contempt judgment 
and affirmed only the criminal contempt conviction. For this 
reason we are dealing with a criminal contempt proceeding. The 
parties should limit their discussion to principles dealing with 
criminal contempt. Discussions about statutes and precedents 
relating to appeals from civil contempt orders are no longer 
relevant to this matter. 
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In the underlying case of D'Aston v. D'Aston. 790 P. 2d 
590 (Utah App. 1990) the Court of Appeals discussed prior Utah 
cases dealing with criminal contempt. The Court stated that in the 
area of criminal appeals, the Utah Supreme Court has dismissed the 
appeal of a prisoner after he escaped custody. See State v. 
Tuttle. 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985). The Court also referred to 
the case of Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 474, (Utah 1981), where 
the Court dismissed an escapee's appeal from a dismissal of Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. In Hardy, the Court held further that a criminal 
appeal that has been dismissed during the escapee's absence should 
be reinstated when the defendant returns to custody. In this way 
the fundamental right to appellate review of a criminal conviction 
is preserved by the reviewing court. This means that under the 
language of the D7Aston case the Court may dismiss a criminal 
appeal when the appellant has escaped from the State's custody. 
But when he returns to prison, either voluntarily or involuntarily, 
his appeal should be reinstated. 
In the matter now before the Court, Mr. Thomas is in the 
same position as a prisoner who has escaped from custody. Since a 
Bench Warrant has been issued for his arrest, he is a fugitive from 
justice. He is subject to immediate arrest and confinement under 
the conviction of contempt. He is now subject to the same 
treatment that was given to the defendant in the Tuttle case. 
Until he is brought back into this jurisdiction and serves his 
sentence, then his appeal should not be allowed. The appeal should 
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now be dismissed, subject to having it reinstated after he has 
returned to Utah to serve his sentence for contempt. 
Respondent will now turn to a discussion of the sub-
issues that were designated by the Court of Appeals in its Order of 
January 7, 1994. 
1. Whether D'Aston actually requires a 30-day grace 
period for contumacious litigants or whether it merely permits such 
a grace period, in the discretion of the appellate court; 
Since this matter involves only a criminal contempt 
conviction, it appears that D'Aston does not require any grace 
period before dismissing the case. The law governing this question 
is found in the Tuttle and Hardy cases. Neither of them even 
discussed granting a grace period to allow the escaped felon to 
race back to prison to preserve his appeal status. For those of us 
who have had occasion to represent escaped felons, one statement 
made by the Supreme Court in the Tuttle opinion appears to be 
realistically humorous: 
"The stated premise of Brady - that an escape 
is an intentional abandonment of an appeal -
is founded upon a questionable assumption, 
i.e., that one who escapes has actually made a 
decision to abandon his appeal. A far more 
reasonable assumption is that the escapee has 
not even considered how his escape will affect 
his appeal rights." 
Most escaped felons are more concerned about how to stay 
out of the custody of the authorities than how to get back into 
such custody. The pendency of an appeal doesn't seem to motivate 
a rush back to prison gates. 
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Even under civil contempt matters, the courts have 
usually taken a sensible approach to such matters. Under the facts 
of this case, it is doubtful that the D'Aston case would require 
any grace period because such a period would have no reasonable 
purpose. To give Mr. Thomas thirty or sixty or ninety days to rush 
down to Kanab and serve his thirty-day sentence in order to 
preserve his appeal rights would be an exercise in futility. Mr. 
Thomas would have great difficulty convincing federal prison 
authorities that they should let him out for a brief "leave of 
absence" to serve another sentence that has been pending against 
him for five years. Such a request is more likely to be written up 
in the humor column of the prison newspaper because of its 
incredible nature. 
The cases cited in D'Aston to support the granting of a 
grace period seem to indicate that the grace period has been used 
to correct or remedy an unacceptable situation that has arisen 
because of the actions of the appellant. On one hand, he refuses 
to comply with the lawful Orders and Judgments of the Trial Court, 
while he is availing himself of the powers of the Appellate Court 
to obtain judicial review. D'Aston itself is a good example of 
this type of remedial action. By adopting the grace period 
approach, the Utah Supreme Court required Mrs. D'Aston to submit 
herself to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court and satisfy that 
Court's concerns before she could exercise a right of appeal. It 
held that she had the obligation to come forward and offer a 
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reasonable alternative to the Trial Court to safeguard her assets 
pending her appeal. 
Another example of this type of approach is found in the 
Nevada Supreme Court case of Closset v. Closset, 71 Nev. 80, 280 
P. 2d 290, (1955), where the appellant had failed to comply with the 
Trial Court Order in a divorce proceeding and had been found in 
contempt. The appeal was not immediately dismissed for failure to 
comply with the Trial Court Judgment, but the Nevada Supreme Court 
ruled that the appeal would be dismissed if the appellant failed to 
submit herself to the process of the Trial Court or posted a 
supersedeas bond within thirty days. The Nevada Court stated that 
it would not permit the appellant to avail himself of judicial 
review while at the same time placing himself beyond the reach of 
the process of the Trial Court in defiance of his attempt to 
enforce its judgment. The Appellate Court insisted that one 
seeking the aid of the Court should remain throughout the course of 
such a proceeding amenable to all judicial process of the State 
which may issue in connection with such a proceeding. 
In the action now before the Court there is no need for 
a grace period because no such corrective or remedial action is 
necessary. Mr. Thomas is a fugitive from justice where his Utah 
conviction is concerned, but he is presently in no position to 
correct or rectify his past actions. Even if Mr. Thomas was given 
a reasonable option to come back to Utah and serve his sentence, he 
couldn't possibly do so until 1996. The Court would have to 
suspend any action on his case until he is released from his 
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Federal Court prison sentence. A short grace period, such as that 
awarded to the defendant in the D'Aston case would not solve any of 
the problems raised in this case. Only a lengthy suspension of 
these proceedings would accomplish such a result. The approach of 
the Court of Appeals in D'Aston simply has no reasonable 
application to the matter now before the Court. 
2. If a thirty-day grace period is otherwise required, 
whether it may be dispensed with in situations where it is 
physically impossible for defendant to bring himself into timely 
compliance with the Trial Court's Orders and process, including in 
the situation of defendant's incarceration out of state; 
Assuming a thirty-day grace period is otherwise required, 
the only reasonable approach in this case would be to dispense with 
that period in the action now before the Court. This is necessary 
because it is physically impossible for the defendant to bring 
himself into timely compliance with the Trial Court's Order and 
process. He is now incarcerated out of state, and he will not be 
available to bring himself into timely compliance until that 
sentence has been completed. It is ludicrous to require that this 
entire proceeding should be placed on hold until he is released 
from his prison sentence in 1996. The more reasonable approach is 
the one set forth in the Tuttle case, which would allow him to have 
his appeal reinstated when he has placed himself in compliance with 
the Court Orders and has served his thirty-day sentence for 
contempt. 
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3. If incarceration out of State might in some instances 
preclude dismissal and require instead a grace period longer than 
30 days, whether the result should be different in cases where 
defendant had ample opportunity, pre-incarceration, to discharge 
the contempt sanction pending against him. 
One salient point of fact should be noted and discussed 
at the outset of this portion of the argument. This is the fact 
that Mr. Thomas brought on the dismissal of his appeal by his own 
voluntary acts and omissions. By his own actions, Mr. Thomas has 
denied himself the right of appeal. He did this by failing to 
purge himself of the contempt of court that he committed some ten 
years ago. After the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and 
sentence in 1988 and ordered the case remanded to the District 
Court for execution of the thirty-day jail sentence, he had every 
reasonable opportunity to comply with the sentence of the Court. 
He could have turned himself in voluntarily, or he could have 
waited for the Sheriff to serve him with appropriate process to 
enforce the Judgment. Instead, for five years he actively avoided 
the Sheriff's efforts to enforce the Order of the Court through 
proper arrest procedures. His actions show his ongoing disregard 
for the judicial process. The Court merely acted on his own non-
compliance with Court Orders to bring about the dismissal of his 
appeal. He had ample opportunity to correct the situation, and he 
never took the opportunity to do so. For this reason alone, the 
Court should give Mr. Thomas no further consideration on his 
appeal. His case should be dismissed, subject to its reinstatement 
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at some future time when he has fully complied with the Orders and 
Judgments of the Trial Court. 
The basis for defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
is that defendant is now physically incapable of bringing himself 
into compliance with the judgment and sentence of the Trial Court 
because he is incarcerated in the Federal Penitentiary for an 
unrelated crime. Defendant cites the Utah case of Bradshaw v. 
Kershaw. 627 P. 2d 528 (1991) as supporting precedent for his 
argument on the defense of impossibility of performance. His 
reliance on that case in this appeal is sorely misplaced. 
A careful analysis of the Bradshaw case makes it clear 
that defendant cannot use the impossibility defense to avoid having 
his present appeal dismissed. After discussing in great detail 
Utah Statutes that provide three different sanctions for contempt, 
the Court stated that, in any event, impossibility of performance 
should never be a defense to the sanctions of punishment or 
indemnification if the ground of impossibility is directly 
traceable to the contemnor's own deliberate acts. In this case, 
defendant wants to use the impossibility defense to excuse himself 
from his own failure to subject himself to the Orders and sentence 
of the Court. 
The appellant also relies upon the case of Jeppson v. 
Jeppson, 597 P.2d 1345 (Utah, 1979), to support his position on the 
impossibility of performance defense. That case gives little 
solace to the appellant in this matter. In Jeppson, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that in cases where punishment is imposed for 
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future contempt, a hearing is needed to determine if the 
impossibility defense applies to such future contempt. In the 
matter now before the Court, the contempt of Mr. Thomas cannot be 
classified as future contempt, and the circumstances are not 
similar to those raised in the Jeppson case. The contempt 
committed by Mr. Thomas has already been adjudicated, and we are 
merely seeking to enforce the punishment that was imposed by the 
Court some five years ago. If the impossibility of performance was 
a proper defense, it should have been asserted at the time that the 
contempt was adjudicated by the Trial Court. The impossibility of 
performance now asserted by the defendant is not a proper defense 
to the dismissal of his appeal because it was never raised in any 
prior proceeding. He is, again, too late to raise this defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the matters set forth herein, the respondent 
submits to the Court that under all the circumstances of this case, 
dismissal of the appeal was an appropriate sanction, and that 
sanction should be upheld by later ruling of this Court. 
The fourteen year history of this case shows that Mr. 
Thomas has no respect for the Orders of any Court. He uses such 
Orders to his advantage when possible, and then ignores them when 
they do not suit his fancy. By this means he has avoided payment 
of a lawful judgment of the Court for over eleven years. Now on 
this appeal, Mr. Thomas continues to use his own indiscretions and 
improper acts to excuse his failure to comply with the Orders of 
the Court. He now finds himself in the Federal Penitentiary 
15 
because of other unrelated felonies that he has committed. He 
alone put himself into a position where it is impossible for him to 
comply with the previous sentence imposed by the Court. He now 
argues that his self-imposed impossibility to perform should excuse 
him from the penalty of dismissal already imposed upon him by the 
Court of Appeals. He overlooks the fact that for over five years 
he had no impediment to bring himself into compliance with the 
lawful process of this State's judiciary, other than his own 
refusal to do so. His incarceration in California may make it 
impossible for him to bring himself into immediate compliance with 
the Court's Order, but he is five years late in making this 
assertion. He has only been unable to comply since April 12, 1993, 
when he entered the Federal Prison in California. He had ample 
opportunity prior to his imprisonment on Federal charges to make 
his peace with the Sixth District Court, if he had any sincere 
desire to do so. 
A solution similar to that followed in the D'Aston case 
is not practical in the present case. Giving Mr. Thomas a grace 
period to comply with his jail sentence and making that a condition 
for going forward with the appeal is not appropriate because he 
cannot possibly comply with any of those conditions until he has 
been released from prison in California. There is no reason to 
postpone further action on this case until he is released from that 
obligation. 
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DATED t h i s ^ day of March, 1994. 
H. RALPH |£LEMM 
Attorney for Respondent 
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